Opinion | A very Russian drama
By Tom Fowdy
Over the course of the weekend, the world was on the edge of its seat as news emerged that the Wagner Private Military Contractor (PMC), led by Yevgeny Prigozhin, decided to rebel against Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin. Accusing Russia's Ministry of Defence of corruption and incompetence, the PMC swiftly occupied Rostov city in Russia's Southwest, before pledging to march on Moscow. Unsurprisingly, western media and commentary circles reacted with euphoria and proclaimed that Russia was proclaiming a full-civil war, with social media quickly becoming hysterical.
However, the drama was swift and abrupt. Just hours later, Prigozhin and Putin brokered a truce that would involve him going into exile in Belarus, with treason charges dropped against him. Despite its hasty conclusion, the media continued by arguing the move had undermined Putin's authority and had politically weakened him, ultimately of course reflecting on the consequences of his decision to initiate the "special military operation" (SMO). It was noted that Putin had gone from hoping to capture Kiev, to potentially defending Moscow.
Although the worst-case scenario was avoided, it might be noted that Russia as a country is no stranger to internal strife, and as a matter of fact, it is exceptional amongst major European countries in its history of such. In contrast to its Western counterparts, the Russian state, in all its forms, be it the Russian Empire, the USSR, or the contemporary Russian Federation, has always been of such a size that it was never able to liberalize or develop in the same light of its western counterparts, which led to a centralization of the state and a greater emphasis on force. This has led to historical cycles of power struggles and rebellion, often triggered by foreign policy setbacks, revolution, and then recentralization.
Whether it be the revolution of 1905 amidst the Russo-Japanese war, the revolution of 1917 following World War I, the fall of the Soviet Union under Gorbachev, the failed resurrection against Boris Yeltsin in 1993, or of course, Wagner's rebellion, history rhymes when common circumstances are played out. There is truth in the notion that the Kremlin did lose some authority amidst the war in Ukraine. From what was designed and calculated to be a swift decapitation of the opponent ended up becoming dragged out into a full-scale war, backed by a Western coalition who seek nothing less than to impose a strategic defeat on Russia.
Amidst it all, Moscow has faced many setbacks against a Ukraine they underestimated, and this has led to a longstanding public feud between Prigozhin and Russia's Ministry of Defence led by Sergei Shoigu. This was most prominent during the battle of Bakhmut, where Prigozhin regularly made claims that he was running out of ammunition, or propagandizing his own losses, in order to shame the Kremlin, something which was latched onto by the Western media. However, his success in capturing Bakhmut and the surrounding areas increasingly strengthened his personal influence and political clout in Russia to the extent he could not only confront the Kremlin itself, but actually get away with it and face only exile as punishment.
However, is Putin truly weakened? Perhaps it is a wake-up call for him over his decisions. But those who are cheerleading the Wagner-led rebellion should be warned that the outcome of any strife is not in fact a more moderate or western-leaning Russia, but a much more extreme and nationalist one. Despite launching such a catastrophic war, Putin is by the measure of many Russian politicians, moderate. He's attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to keep the SMO as a "side" war to the country and avoid a full-scale escalation. For hardliners, such as Prigozhin, he's seen as soft and incompetent above anything and it goes to show that Wagner as a mercenary group was a far more lethal and destructive force than Russia's army itself.
That is because it is an army of violent former convicts who are not only hardline nationalists, but are also fighting for money too, as well as having experience in many, many conflicts across the Middle East and Africa. Prigozhin seemingly played his hand well and didn't miscalculate. That's an embarrassment for Putin, but it's not a gamechanger against him. It will certainly force him to rethink things, but not in a way that will be favorable to Ukraine. At the moment, its counteroffensive is struggling and the news cycle has been distracted. However, as I said before 2023 will be the defining year of the war. Either Ukraine cuts through and places itself in a decisive position, or it does not. No predictions, time will tell.
The author is a well-seasoned writer and analyst with a large portfolio related to China topics, especially in the field of politics, international relations and more. He graduated with an Msc. in Chinese Studies from Oxford University in 2018.
The views do not necessarily reflect those of DotDotNews.
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