By Tom Fowdy
In the year 2018, the first Trump administration renamed the United States Pacific Command to the "Indo-Pacific" Command. The renaming was a geopolitical and strategic move, merging the Indian and Pacific oceans into one gigantic pan-region, which was stated to be decisive for the world's economic and political future. As a part of this, the shift signalled a tilt towards building a greater relationship between the United States and India, whom in their view would be a critical partner to containing the rise of China. Like clockwork, the world of academia, international relations, think-tanks and the media adopted this strategic term "Indo-Pacific" as the new reality.
But roll forward to last week, June 2026, and the second Trump administration has abruptly reversed the name change it made in the first place, the US Department of Defence having announced that the command would be renamed "Pacific" once again. US think tanks justified the move as in line with the Trump administration's foreign policy of minimizing its military bandwidth through the "America First" paradigm, affirming the Western Pacific was the most important region. However, it was also undeniable that it represented a revision in the United States's bilateral relationship with India, which previously the US had courted as an increasingly close partner in past years. But question is, why?
From 2018-2022, the United States and India had an overlapping number of common interests. First, the US saw India as a clear strategic counterweight to China. With its geographical position projecting into the ocean, its massive population and its economic potential, New Delhi could rise to become a great power with the ability to counter China's influence on multiple fronts across the "Indo-pacific", as a manufacturing and military powerhouse. The US pushed this aggressively in the early years, encouraging firms to move production to India amongst other things, while groups such as the QUAD, Australia, India, Japan and the US, became a cornerstone of regional strategy.
On the other hand, the Modi government of India saw the United States as an enabler of India's rise. New Delhi came to the conclusion at the time that antagonism of Beijing served the national interest, and sought to ride on the tidal wave of anti-China sentiment escalated by that Trump administration to gain economic and strategic benefits. They quickly produced an escalation of tensions which led to the Galwan Valley Clash of 2020, banned Chinese technology firms, TikTok and severely limited Chinese investment into the country. Modi, a nationalist, sought to establish his country as a great power and believed these tactical friendships, yet not formalised alliances, were a means to an end. It did not see itself as an American subordinate at any point.
Now, the world has changed since that time, multiple times over. The last sentence carries an important point regarding India's strategic positioning, as India does not initiate formal "alliances" but maintains what it describes as "strategic autonomy" on a premise of neutrality and tilts in the direction suits its national interests. Since 2018-2022, many things have subsequently occurred which recalibrated India's positioning. First of all, Russia invaded Ukraine. Russia is a strategic partner of India, it provides oil, which a country of 1.4 billion needs a lot of, and access to weaponry too. However, when this war broke out, the US and its allies wanted to economically isolate Russia. India refused to cooperate, this was the first fracture. Thus, during the Biden term, relations were not hostile, but started to wither.
Second, Donald Trump returned to office, a very different Trump to his first term. Having excluded the NeoConservatives that shaped his foreign policy the first time around, Trump 2.0 initiated a much more MAGA approach to other countries which sought to unilaterally assert American interests across the board. Part of this has involved a global trade war, in which the President decided to burn the relationship with New Delhi he once cultivated and throw massive tariffs at them.
Why? Because Trump's protectionism had moved from "simply targeting China" in his first term to now embracing a worldwide scope with universal levies. Trump does not want India to become "another China" and for it to become just another location for US companies to ship cheap to America and undermine local industry. Second, India again refused to compromise over importing Russian oil, which also resulted in more tariffs. Third, the more hardline Anti-immigration sentiment of the Trump administration has stopped viewing India as an opportunity, but part of the problem. US right-wing social media over the past few years has become awash with Anti-Indian sentiment and it has become a new form of racism highly visible on X; it is theorised this has had an impact on America's willingness to engage.
Next, having witnessed these broader strategic shifts, and also having realised that its Anti-China approach didn't deliver the comprehensive benefits that were once hoped, India has reset its strategy pertaining to Beijing in tandem. The border dispute has been de-escalated, diplomatic engagement has resumed to some level, Modi visited Beijing last year, and India has since recalibrated its economic strategy on the belief that, rather than trying to exclude China, it can benefit from becoming itself a key part of the global supply chain by becoming its export engine to the world.
Thus, India has returned to a cautious middle ground. It is not hostile to the United States, and will not seek an antagonistic relationship, but the days of embracing Washington are over as a clear response to changing geopolitical currents. As such, the US also does not see India as essential to its own strategic objectives and has subsequently dropped the mantra of the "Indo-Pacific." The Trump administration sees the western hemisphere, or the Americas, as the focal point for its own security, and the Western Pacific is naturally seen as an extension of that. As a result, the Indian Ocean is seen as an irrelevant side quest, and while they are at it, they don't want to create a new peer competitor in the process, as I have said for years. Thus, as it always has been, India is back to doing its own thing, for now.
The views do not necessarily reflect those of DotDotNews.
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