By Tom Fowdy
When Russia invaded Ukraine in early 2022, President of the European Ursula Von Der Leyen came out all guns blazing as a transatlanticist NeoConservative who threw everything at aligning the EU with the United States. Flying to Beijing to denounce her much-loathed "de-risking" agenda in a visit that was met with displeasure, Der Leyden later announced a wide range of probes into Chinese subsidies and proceeded last year to impose duties on the import of Chinese-made electric vehicles, as well as demand technology transfer information for the batteries. She also began more broadly sanctioning Chinese firms for their alleged role in the Ukraine war.
This was all feasible under a Biden administration, which interpreted transatlantic on more ideological terms, but now the decision of the commission president to "put all her eggs in one basket" looks strikingly naïve as the White House under Trump now adopts what is an antagonistic position towards Europe on the matter of the Ukraine conflict and trade in general, including proposed tariffs on the EU. This has diplomatically isolated UDVL, which threw the bloc's relationship with Beijing under the bus respectively and binned the "Comprehensive Agreement on Investment" (CAI) in favor of a more aggressive trade confrontation. This begs the question, what now?
If European leaders are geopolitically smart and understand Realpolitik, the obvious solution to Trump's hostile overtures should be to engage Beijing once again in order to cultivate balance in their position, as well as provide an additional economic and diplomatic option. It has always been publicly stated that China is seen as an essential player in ending the war in Ukraine, albeit with the caveat that it should be strictly on Western terms, and not demanding compromise with the Kremlin. Yet, given now Europe is not in a position to make demands from Beijing, do they have any other options?
China has always been ambivalent about the war, perhaps because it also represents a bit of a geopolitical quagmire for them. While Russia represents a critical geopolitical "without limits" strategic partner (a deal Putin deliberately formulated before jumping into that war), Beijing nonetheless sees the conflict in Ukraine as problematic to the extent that it has accelerated American alliance politics and defense integration in Europe through NATO expansionism and the narrative of "democracy vs. tyranny."
However, that is no longer applicable under Donald Trump, who cares little about European defense and wants the war in Ukraine simply to end in a way that European countries find offensive, presumably so he can move on to his main agenda, which will of course be, China. In this case, why would Beijing want to end the war when it serves as a point of transatlantic friction, and for the time being, a distraction, from the broader anti-China agenda? There is also an obvious anticipation for the US to try and narrowly re-engage Russia, which will also give Moscow options beyond the position of dependency upon Beijing. Some of the more extreme US realists want to engineer another "Sino-Soviet" split-type event.
Of course, China also needs a strong relationship with Europe, especially in courting them away from greater allegiance with the US and securing continued economic engagement. Beijing thus holds diplomatic leverage over the European Union, the situation created by UVDL's reckless pro-US approach and Trump's disorder creates an opening point whereby China can seek concessions in exchange for supporting any peace proposals in Ukraine. This should include a rollback of the Commission President's aggressive anti-China trade agenda pushed in 2023-2024, amongst other things. It has the opportunity to take the lead on the continent and exploit the vacuum of American leadership to its own ends. Of course, it will also do so in its own textbook "China" way which will continue to avoid taking clear positions on these contentious issues, pledging non-interference, framing itself as the mediator, and seeking to pull the parties towards its interests.
Beijing has naturally preferred stability in the pursuit of its economic development goals, yet I cannot help but think here China might actually favor this "particular state of chaos" because of its diplomatic opportunities. Beijing can nudge Moscow towards seeking peace but recognizes that Russia's isolation is to its strategic advantage, so we won't be expecting China to recognize any of the country's occupied territories in Ukraine, even if it objects to its inclusion in NATO. With this taken into consideration, China will prefer a freeze of the status quo, with contention between Europe and the US, but also Europe doing everything it can to stop American engagement with Moscow so that its own position is not weakened. The time is right for China to jump in and be an ambivalent middleman, playing all sides against each other.
The views do not necessarily reflect those of DotDotNews.
Read more articles by Tom Fowdy:
Opinion | The Trump doctrine of economic imperialism
Opinion | The rule of law and justice in the age of hyper-partisan politics
Opinion | Another famous Trumpian Twist
Opinion | There is a Taiwan confrontation bubbling, look at the signs
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