By Tom Fowdy
On Sunday the first China-Japan-South Korea trilateral summit was held in Seoul, with China's Li Qiang meeting with South Korean President Yoon Seok-Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida. This was the first trilateral between the countries since 2019, with disruptions having been caused due to the pandemic. Beijing obviously wanted to utilize the event as a means of affirming stable economic and trade ties between the two countries, who as allies of the United States are subjected to Washington's influence accordingly.
While Tokyo has become almost devoutly pro-US in regards to the equation with China, South Korea has continually occupied a grey "middle ground" whereby it is more strategically ambiguous and amicable to Beijing, even as Yoon has made pro-American and Japanese overtures during his time. Given the events of the past few years, this event arguably represents an important "reset" between the three countries, if we can as much as call it that, and thus we must question to what extent can this trilateralism work? And can Beijing meaningfully stabilize ties with Japan?
China's fundamental concern in engaging with Japan and South Korea is to stop the United States from breaking regional integration and economic ties through its ambition to contain Beijing. American foreign policy under Joe Biden is premised on forcing countries to "take sides" through alliance-building systems that seek to divide countries on ideological, technological, and economic lies. This has for example included the creation of new alliance blocs such as AUKUS, the "Indo-Pacific Economic Framework", the new Japan-US-Philippines, trilateral grouping, amongst others. In doing so, the US actively endeavors to tear up regional supply chains, especially on technologies, pursue militarization with the view to opposing China, and destroy the non-alignment posture of ASEAN.
In respect to this emerging environment, Japan has positioned itself as America's leading and foremost partner, with Kishida having upgraded ties even further during his latest visit to Washington. Tokyo in particular sees China as its foremost rival for influence in Asia, and seeks to contain its influence where possible. South Korea, however, is a bit different. Although also a US ally, South Korea is smaller, geographically closer to China, and more economically integrated, and the structure of its relationship with the United States is premised more specifically on the North Korea issue than a wider-ranging one as a general role. Of course, Yoon Seok Yeol has subtly sought to expand this with US backing, deepening Seoul's engagement with NATO and sticking his nose into the Taiwan issue, amongst other things, but a great deal of this is symbolic for the time being.
Thus, for China, it is imperative to try and make the case that there is value in having both countries preserve their relationships with Beijing amidst pressure from the US. Thus, Beijing inevitably spoke of improving market access and free trade. Undeniably, Japan and South Korea benefit existentially from having China's consumer market on their doorsteps. However, one pressing issue is that not only is America putting pressure on Seoul and Tokyo to engage in export controls regarding selling semiconductors to China, but moreover there is the growing problem that China's economic ascendency in chips and drive for self-sufficiency poses to erode whatever trade advantages these countries once had over Beijing initially.
Across the last few decades, South Korea and Japan enriched themselves by selling technological goods to Beijing holding the innovative advantage for themselves. This balance of power is now changing as China moves up the global value chain, with Seoul having already lost its trade surplus with Beijing due to it gaining dominance over lower node chips, nullifying the need for Korean imports and instead, exporting them back. It is precisely because of the rise of companies such as Huawei already that Samsung has lost its market share in electronic consumer goods. These considerations alone drive not decoupling, but certainly "derisking" in the pursuit of market expansionism and manufacturing offshoring elsewhere. It also makes cooperation with US supply chain policies attractive as it allows them to retain their dominance.
Because of this, China has to demonstrate real benefits to both Seoul and Tokyo to keep them on board, this means making market concessions and incentivizing the flow of regional economic integration. The return of trilateralism is a good thing for regional stability, especially as the US continues to try and enhance all its alliances and reshape the regional order. America also recognizes that by escalating tensions on various fronts, such as the South China Sea and Taiwan, it can further drive a wedge in relations. In this sense, Beijing's best bet is continued diplomacy and restraint. All sides may have the incentive to improve ties, but nothing is guaranteed yet.
The author is a well-seasoned writer and analyst with a large portfolio related to China topics, especially in the field of politics, international relations and more. He graduated with an Msc. in Chinese Studies from Oxford University in 2018.
The views do not necessarily reflect those of DotDotNews.
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