By Tom Fowdy
Donald Trump insists that we are "the closest we've ever been to ending the Ukraine war." The comments came as Russia claimed it is "ready in principle" to resume peace talks, following a visit by two US special envoys to Moscow on Wednesday. According to Reuters, such three-way talks will begin next month.
Over the past week or so, I have published numerous pieces detailing how Donald Trump's sudden intervention in the Ukraine conflict of late, and "stage-managed" hostility towards Kyiv have been motivated by one obvious priority: The US mid-term elections. The President needs to at least cultivate the image of peace, progress and stability in order to rescue his party from low approval ratings and soothe global energy markets amidst his catastrophe in Iran. Trump is the master of using rhetoric to hail progress where little to none often exists, as found in numerous so-called "deals" in the past, including ironically with Iran itself.
That itself may raise a red flag that actually to secure peace, is not the same as creating the impression or feeling of it, and it is the devil of the details as to where Trump has repeatedly failed in the "agreements" he cultivates. The Russia-Ukraine war, at its heart, is an enormous conflict between two very different strategic sets of interests, of which have become politically irreconcilable. The reason it has dragged on for nearly five years now is more complex than a simple narrative of Russian failure or Ukraine's unwillingness to pursue peace, rather it concerns the completely zero-sum structure which both parties have vested in it, which translates to a mindset of "total victory and nothing less."
From the Russian point of view, the current Ukrainian state is an ultra-nationalist hostile regime which seeks to join a western-led security alliance and thus poses an unacceptable threat to its own strategic interests. Kremlin policymakers, as misguided as we can argue it has all been, ultimately came to the conclusion that the only suitable course of action to take was to try and terminate the Kyiv regime by force and draw it back into Russia's own sphere of influence, while annexing its Russian-speaking territories in the process. Moscow wrongly underestimated Ukraine's willingness to resist, leading to a failed regime change and a prolonged war of attrition. If the war was to stop now, then Russia has failed to achieve its most important objectives.
On the other hand, Ukraine sees itself as locked in a war of national liberation which will ultimately determine its own sovereignty and independent existence. Because of this sentiment, compromise with Russia is seen as a form of capitulation and is politically untenable to agree to, we can describe the "feeling" of such as akin to Germany signing the Treaty of Versailles, as compromise from the Kremlin's point of view would consist of accepting territorial changes and forced neutrality. Thus, Ukraine has from the beginning advocated maximalist political rhetoric which demands liberation of all occupied territories and Russia's total defeat, as unrealistic as that is.
Ukraine's position has likewise been bolstered by certain countries in Europe, most predominantly the United Kingdom, who have also advocated opposition to compromise and sought to undermine peace talks by pledging to place a military presence in the country after the war ends, a red-line for Moscow. We can thus infer from these two vastly different political priorities, that to end the war as it is right now satisfies neither. For Russia, the country will have suffered enormous economic and military costs just for Ukraine to be able to continue its tilt towards western security alliances, and without the territorial gains needed to secure a total capitulation. For Vladimir Putin, ending now would see the war be depicted as a massive strategic failure that has not improved the country's strategic position in any way. Thus, Trump's initial attempts to end the conflict have come to nothing and instead it has lingered on for the first two years of his second term, with both sides desperate try and push the other to the brink of defeat.
So, would this renewed effort at peace really make any difference? First, it is worth remembering that Trump's immediate interests, electioneering, are short-termist and most certainly not a long-term strategic vision. The President does not have to end the war now, he merely needs to cultivate the impression of progress, as he always does, and reap the public opinion benefit of that. For him, this is as far as he can go. Secondly, we should recognise that Moscow gains more from the impression of peace than Ukraine does. This is because even if Putin really has no intention of ending the war, he still sees strategic benefits in improving relations with the US and the diplomatic leverage that comes with it. On the other hand, Ukraine experiences anxiety precisely because America is embracing their enemy, and the President is threatening to throw them under the bus.
Thus, while outcomes such as a "temporary ceasefire" are not beyond the realm of possibility, we should nonetheless rubbish the idea of a formalised peace treaty. To stop fighting is one thing, to sign a secure agreement is another and this is where the real ruptures begin. Ukraine will not agree to formally cede territory to Russia, European powers will not recognise it and seek to sabotage it with "security agreements" and thus Moscow's failure to "subjugate" Kyiv will continue to drive their behaviour. These considerations will continue to be major fault lines which will ultimately make peace talks extremely difficult. Peace in principle is not the same as peace as a substantial outcome. Trump wants the former, benefiting him now, while the details can wait until later, thus, he is no closer to truly "ending" this as he was two years ago.
The views do not necessarily reflect those of DotDotNews.
Read more articles by Tom Fowdy:
Opinion | Understanding Trump's 'stage-managed hostility' in diplomacy and acts towards Ukraine
Opinion | 'Building Bridges'- How North Korea went from isolated pariah to strategic counterweight
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