By Tom Fowdy
This week US President Donald Trump took the abrupt step of demanding that its joint military exercises with South Korea be scaled down because they were, in his opinion, "provocative" to the north, of which he then stated he has a "good relationship" with Kim Jong-un. The President had also specified that Seoul's unwillingness to "help out" over the US war in Iran was a contributing factor, representing an unusual singling out of the East Asian country even as most other allies keep their distance.
Trump's discontent with America's military relationship with South Korea is not new. In his first term, he demanded Seoul pay more to host America's own troops in its country, and following a period of extreme tensions pursued a path of dialogue with the north that led to multiple meetings between himself and Kim Jong-un. Despite this, however, the status quo on the Korean peninsula has never actually shifted, with talks over denuclearisation going nowhere and Washington not allowing the President to forsake its ally.
Despite the latest round of posturing, things will not change. Those who assume they will do not understand the Trump administration. The Western mainstream media, as well as Neo-Conservative analysts and their relevant institutions, enjoy framing the Trump Presidency as isolationist who is ready at the drop of a hat to forsake America's allies and jump in bed with its enemies. To an extent, the argument is not unfounded, for we can assess in Trump's second term that he has pursued a much less "values" marketed foreign policy and has instead focused on raw, often explicit, national interest in a unilateralist manner.
For Trump, allies are there to be used as tools in order to support American interests in a way that is one-way traffic. Alliances are less about values and partnership, and more so about immediate, transactional benefits. For example, Trump will often place tariffs on allied states, demanding unilateral market capitulation in exchange for partial relief, as well as demanding absurd amounts of investment from them into the US itself. This does not, however, translate into a so-called opposition to "war" or strategic abandonment of such states in favour of a competitor, as tempting as it is for more interventionist figures to push the narrative.
Instead, Trump simply pushes to squeeze as many concessions out of the ally in question to make the arrangement "profitable" while never truly giving in, in a pattern which analysts and commentators like to describe as "Trump always chickens out" (TACO). For example, has Trump stopped funding Ukraine? The answer is no, he isn't. Despite many MAGA opposing US funding Kyiv's defence during the Biden administration, the President has effectively decided to implicitly continue. The only difference is, unlike the Biden White House, the current administration just does it silently. The Trump administration has even permitted Kyiv undertaking massive, long-range drone strikes into Russia.
Likewise, Trump may not actively incite Taiwan independence sentiment as the Biden Administration did, and pay stronger rhetorical lip service to "One China", famously switching their line from the US "opposes changes in the status quo" to "does not support," however, in practice Washington still sells them arms. The pattern is very clear, Trump, while the executive figurehead, is not truly allowed to deviate from American strategic objectives by the broader diplomatic, intelligence and military infrastructure around him. He may pursue American foreign policy more assertively, abruptly and transactionally, but the fundamentals do NOT change, only the marketing and the method.
This brings us to the topic of South Korea; we should understand American relations with South Korea through the lens of Washington having extraordinary leverage over Seoul. For its entire history, South Korea has been effectively dependent on the United States for its national survival, with the US army based in their country, having operational control of their armed forces during wartime (something the US will not give up), and control of the demilitarized zone border (DMZ) through the UN command. These factors give Donald Trump extraordinary cards to play in order to bully Seoul into making concessions to please the US, whether it be paying more for hosting their troops or pledging an eyewatering $300 billion into American investments.
As a result, Trump-led complaints about South Korea freeloading, or threats to withdraw, are opportunistic smoke and mirrors. In reality, the President would never be allowed to simply pull out of such a strategic country and allow North Korea to attain the upper hand through its nuclear weaponry. It is for this precise reason that the US never wants to change the status quo, and does not despite what they claim, wish for any breakthrough in peace talks between the North and the South that does not involve total capitulation by Pyongyang first. The US "blob," so to speak, does not want the strategic need for America's presence on the peninsula to be nullified, which is why any outcome whereby the two Koreans make an equal peace between themselves and thus cater to North-led demands for US expulsion is a non-starter.
This is why Trump's original talks with Kim Jong-un in 2018 and 2019 went nowhere, because from Washington's interests, the outcome is capitulation or nothing. Thus, even if Donald Trump meets with Kim Jong-un again and has more "beautiful letters" exchanged, we should not expect a serious shift in American foreign policy. Trump sees South Korea as useful to shake down, not to discard, and while Trump is nonetheless a pragmatist who enjoys the spectacle of big leader-to-leader summits with strongmen, such as Kim Jong-un or Putin, the record is very clear he never truly gives them what they want. Instead, he seeks deals which ultimately seek to favour American interests, often with deeply exaggerated optics on his behalf.
So, Trump will twist, moan and grumble at South Korea, but the status quo won't change.
The views do not necessarily reflect those of DotDotNews.
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