By Dr. Hon. Lee Hoey Simon (Member of the Basic Law Committee of the NPCSC, Ph.D. in Law Tsinghua University)
On July 12, 2026, the US, the Philippines, Japan, and some other countries issued a so‑called joint statement to "commemorate" the tenth anniversary of the South China Sea arbitration award, proclaiming a "rules‑based order" and constantly demanding that China comply with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). However, when we turn to the maritime practices of these countries, what we see is a quintessential double standard—"use it when convenient, discard it when not." The so‑called "rules‑based order" is in essence an "order based on the interests of these countries."
I. The US: Outsider to UNCLOS and Self‑Appointed Judge
The most flagrant practitioner of double standards in the application of international law is the US. As the world's preeminent maritime power, the US has long asserted maritime rights under UNCLOS, yet has persistently refused to ratify the Convention, unwilling to be constrained by it.
On one hand, the US refuses to join UNCLOS and evades its treaty obligations; on the other, it presumes to act as UNCLOS's "judge," demanding that other States comply with the Convention while arbitrarily interpreting it to suit its purposes. On the South China Sea issue, the US demands that all States abide by UNCLOS, yet it is not even a party to the Convention—this is the very essence of double standards.
A State that is not even a party to UNCLOS, yet presumes to be its defender and arbitrarily criticizes other States' maritime rights and interests—this is legally and logically untenable. The US stands behind the Philippines, denigrating China, purely for geopolitical reasons to contain China.
II. Japan: Okinotorishima as "Island" and Taiping as "Rock"
If America's double standard consists of "standing outside while pointing fingers," Japan's consists of "different treatment for the same thing."
Okinotorishima is a reef in the Pacific Ocean, with an area of approximately 10 square meters above water at high tide. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS, rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall not have an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. Since 2004, China has formally stated that it does not recognize Japan's claim to an EEZ or continental shelf based on Okinotorishima. In April 2012, the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS)—a technical body established under UNCLOS—in its recommendations on Japan's submission for the outer continental shelf, did not recognize Japan's claimed outer continental shelf based on Okinotorishima.
Yet the Japanese government not only classifies Okinotorishima as an "island," but has artificially reinforced and filled it to create the appearance of an "island," and on this basis claims a vast exclusive economic zone. On one hand, Japan supports the South China Sea arbitration award, which classified Taiping Island, with its 500,000 square meters and fresh water resources, as a "rock". On the other hand, it claims an EEZ based on Okinotorishima, a 10‑square‑meter reef.
The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson posed a pointed rhetorical question: since Japan has declared its support for the content of the "award," China has reason to believe that Japan has, by the same standard, voluntarily renounced its corresponding maritime claims. Japan has used steel, cement, and concrete to desperately reinforce that reef—barely the size of a tatami mat at high tide—and on that basis claims 400,000 square kilometers of EEZ. Under the "South China Sea arbitration standard," should Japan not immediately abandon this claim?
Professor Kōki Kyōtsu, Professor Emeritus at Yamaguchi University in Japan, pointed out that the Japanese government's approach is a textbook example of double standards. Japan supports the "South China Sea arbitration award" on one hand, and on the other hand artificially reinforces and fills Okinotorishima to present it as an "island"—a plainly self‑contradictory position.
III. Systematic Double Standards in the Maritime Practice of States that Issued the Statement
The tribunal's interpretation of Article 121—particularly its stringent standard for "rocks"—is seriously out of step with the maritime practice of States worldwide. Stephen Fietta, a British international law scholar and founder of Fietta LLP, pointed out that after the 2016 award, "State practice has not been rewritten by it; many States continue to claim EEZs and continental shelves over certain features, inconsistent with the tribunal's stringent interpretation of 'rocks' under Article 121."
This means that these States that issued the statement continue to claim EEZs and continental shelves over small features that do not meet the "rock" definition. On the one hand, they demand China to accept the tribunal's stringent standard, and on the other hand, they claim broad maritime rights for similar features of their own. This "strict with others, lenient with oneself" approach fully exposes the true nature of the so‑called "rules‑based order"—rules are merely tools to constrain others, not to constrain oneself.
IV. Double Standards: The Legal Packaging of Hegemony
Double standards are not accidental deviations in practice, but a systematic choice serving geostrategic interests. The South China Sea arbitration was from start to finish a "political farce disguised in legal garb." The so‑called award has become the "international law narrative" through which certain extra‑regional countries "seek to maximize their own interests in the South China Sea and squeeze China's geopolitical space."
The tribunal's handling of the Philippines' submissions fully reflects this politicization. The tribunal often pre‑set conclusions before selectively collecting evidence from the Chinese side and making unfounded accusations. It cited a few recent and highly controversial judicial precedents to support its views, while ignoring the many international judicial precedents that contradicted its conclusions. This selective application of law and precedent is not impartial judicial adjudication, but the search for legal footnotes to predetermined political conclusions—and a damage to the international rule of law.
V. Conclusion
When the US has not ratified UNCLOS yet presumes to be its judge; when Japan claims an EEZ based on the 10‑square‑meter Okinotorishima while supporting the classification of the 500,000‑square‑meter Taiping Island as a "rock"; when certain countries demand that China to accept stringent standards they themselves do not observe—the hypocrisy of the so‑called "rules‑based order" stands fully exposed.
This is not a "rules‑based order"—this is a "hegemony‑based order": rules are selectively interpreted and applied to other States, while those who proclaim them remain unconstrained. The vitality of international law lies in equal application—equality before the rules for all States, not selective application as a tool based on self‑interest. The South China Sea arbitration is the most typical illustration of this double standard—a tragedy in which the international rule of law has been used as a political tool.
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