By Tom Fowdy
Yesterday, the Trump administration listed a number of Chinese companies as having "links to the country's military", a blacklist which formally bans them from having business contracts with the US Department of Defence, while otherwise acting symbolically in an attempt to deter US firms from establishing close ties with them and undermining their investment. Amongst the companies listed were Alibaba, Baidu, and BYD, none of which have any military ties or purposes whatsoever.
What is to understand here? First of all, any honest observer must recognise that the United States weaponises the notion of "national security" in order to serve obvious protectionist ends. Such discourse is rarely based on actual facts, but more so sentiment, as arousing suspicion or paranoia pertaining to a firm is enough to establish a politically justifying presence for market exclusion. It should be understood that American foreign policy has always been premised on the opportunistic utilisation of paranoia and hypothetical "worst-case scenarios" to meet its goals.
American politics is about creating a hysterical talking point, jumping to the worst possible conclusion, and shouting the loudest. Just a few days ago, the United States announced sweeping restrictions on the Iranian national football team's participation in the upcoming 2026 FIFA World Cup. The team must enter the US, go through customs and immigration, and then exit again, all on the same day they are playing, not being permitted to stay on US soil. What justification did the White House give for these draconian measures, they said "We will not allow Iran to sneak terrorists into the United States." This nonsensical statement is a textbook example of how politically cultivated mass paranoia is a big part of the US playbook.
Thus, when it comes to China, the United States deliberately weaponizes absurdist scenarios of "spying" in order to justify market disqualification for selected companies and products. The mainstream media usually treats these opportunistic calls as "concerns", laundering them with legitimacy and allowing 3rd party countries, such as Britain, to adopt the same discourse without any scrutiny. As a result, one legal route the United States takes to formalise such concerns is to claim, citing the Party-State system of China, that a company is in fact working with or associated with China's military, as part of a process called "Civil-Military Fusion". Again, this does not have to be based on facts, simply an insinuation designed to satisfy political goals.
Trump has done this before. In the last days of his final term, he designated the Chinese smartphone firm Xiaomi as one such "military" company. A subsequent legal challenge by the brand found that the administration's criteria for inclusion were justified on them having received an award for "building socialism with Chinese characteristics" than any actual military affiliation. This goes without question, after all, how is an E-commerce Giant such as Alibaba, militarily relevant|? The answer is the end justifies the means, and the Donald Trump administration sees firms such as this, which in real terms represent a challenge to American jobs and manufacturing, as bargaining chips in broader negotiations with China.
Right now, Donald Trump wants to cut a trade deal with Beijing, but a big part of the deal he seeks involves attaining increased market access in China. He has reversed course slightly on some US technological embargo policies, wanting Beijing to buy more American chips, and is not happy with their policy to slowly exclude US tech products as they build their own capabilities. As a result, he is seeking leverage in order to try and force an outcome of greater reciprocity. If China wants its firms to be able to participate in US markets more freely, then they have to also stop restricting American products accordingly. Firms such as Alibaba are not truly seen as threatening US technological hegemony in the way, let's say, Huawei was with telecommunications, thus the President sees them as a dispensable aspect of negotiations. It's also worth noting that Baidu, as an internet and AI company, has very little stake in the United States, whereas on the other hand, the US is determined to keep Chinese automobiles out of its own markets to safeguard its heavily protectionist domestic industry.
Following on from Trump's visit to China, Xi Jinping has also been invited to visit the United States. Trump has, on one hand, discarded the confrontational policy against Beijing that was crafted by his previous administration, and accelerated by Joe Biden, but has nonetheless stayed firm on a transparent stance of American protectionism. Trump sees making deals with China, which favour American jobs and interests, as his form of victory in an economic competition with Beijing, as opposed to the ideological confrontation pushed by Mike Pompeo. The question is, can he attain the leverage to get what he wants? Things like these listings may unnerve certain firms, but they certainly don't change the status quo or make China rush to open its markets.
The views do not necessarily reflect those of DotDotNews.
Read more articles by Tom Fowdy:
Opinion | Trump's new 'forced labour' gambit is another, indirect shot at China
Opinion | The rise of ethno-nationalist politics in Britain
Opinion | Understanding Trump's frozen status quo tactics regarding an 'Iran deal'
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