By Tom Fowdy
During the Biden administration (2021-2025), US foreign policy around China settled around a group of strategic goals, originally derived from the first Trump administration. Chief to this effort was the assumption that if the United States pursued an ever-growing technological embargo against Beijing, denying it access to leading components and technologies, America would ultimately sustain its economic and military advantages over China, and in the long term, it would stagnate. One of the chief architects of this policy was Jake Sullivan, who described it as a "small-yard, high fence."
The policy of growing technological embargo was complimented by what we might describe as an aggressive, multilateral hostility towards China, aiming to expand American militarisation around the country's periphery and escalating tensions in both the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea. The aggressive Biden-era foreign policy was heralded as "America is back," and the general media narrative repeatedly, perhaps intentionally, spoke of how China had already "peaked" and was now "in decline," citing a lack of optimism surrounding its economy.
Indeed, China has had a rough past half-decade, precisely because American decision-making has intentionally sought to rip up aspects of globalization in order to cement its power, which has either caused, or been further derived from, globally disruptive events: including the COVID pandemic, Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Trump's trade wars, and now the Iran war. For the world as a whole, it feels like the "good times" have long gone, and we live in a constantly uncertain, if not precarious, situation. Thus, it goes without saying that such huge geopolitical shockwaves have had a significant impact on China, its strategies, and economic governance.
Yet, as of 2026, the situation is far from apocalyptic in Beijing. The path pursued by the second Trump administration appears to have been beneficial, as opposed to fatal, for Beijing, as much as they have been disruptive, and have in fact revealed the true extent of Chinese power as opposed to limiting it. Moreover, many of the assumptions the Biden era legacy was built upon, have not aged well. In 2025, China attained a record trade surplus of $1.189 trillion, having exported $6.36 trillion in goods. This came despite Trump's added tariffs, with China not only having succeeded in diversifying its trade partners but also ascending the value chain in certain critical areas, such as electric vehicles.
Likewise, America's technological embargos have failed to prevent China's advancement in semiconductor supply chains, with its chip exports growing by 73% in the first two months of 2026. China has also succeeded in reverse engineering the Dutch firm ASML's technology to build a "ultraviolet lithography machine" in Shenzhen, which it aims to be operational by 2028. Similarly, China's hold over certain strategic resources, such as critical minerals, has also been more greatly leveraged in trade disputes to gain the upper hand in retaliation to tariffs and export controls, which was strong enough to even make Trump himself relent on some chip controls. Beyond that, as Trump has personally become a disruptive force in global politics, many countries who were ardently hostile to China over the past decade, including Canada, India, and the United Kingdom, have chosen to re-engage with Beijing.
This shift in mood also tells us a bigger story: That the Anti-China fanaticism and containment push of 2020-2025 ultimately did not pay off, and even for the Trump administration itself, policy has been replaced with a cooler, more balanced pragmatism that avoids framing China in overt "enemy" terms. This new strand of thinking may see China as a systemic and economic competitor, but it subtly relegates the "Cold War" pattern of thinking that was introduced to US statecraft by the likes of Mike Pompeo. With this shift comes the recognition that China is essential to the global economy (and even Trump himself knows it) and thus "decoupling" is above all an undesirable and destructive outcome. Recent events will only reinforce this.
The Iran war, for one, is a 21st-century Vietnam-level catastrophe that globally undermines confidence in American power. Why? It shows that the United States is not omnipotent to destroy every enemy state it wishes, even if it surrounds them with bases, that US deterrence cannot protect allies and moreover, it breaks the "superiority bubble" of American military technology that the Ukraine war propaganda instilled, as Iran has been able to destroy US military facilities and equipment. This leads us to question that if this is the damage Iran can cause, which is poor and not a great power, what could the full force of China's much larger and more advanced military capacity achieve against America?
In conclusion, we seem to be entering a new era where China's power and influence are being indirectly accepted for what they are, than the pursuit of failed attempts to roll it back. What this should cautiously remind us, however, is that history is seldom "fatal" based on the trajectory of trends. Instead, the course of events can readily be influenced by the personal decision-making of individual human beings, creating circumstances that could not be readily accounted for at the time of their prediction. Who knew Trump would do the things he did?
The views do not necessarily reflect those of DotDotNews.
Read more articles by Tom Fowdy:
Opinion | Trump's talk of seizing Iran's Kharg Island will be another disaster in the making
Opinion | The Collapse of an already dubious Ukraine peace
Opinion | Trump's barely disguised market manipulation papers over the cracks
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