By Tom Fowdy
On September 3, China will hold a commemorative parade to celebrate Victory Day, marking 80 years since the end of World War II, or more locally, China's war against Japan, which is called the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War.
As part of the commemorations, 26 heads of state of foreign countries will attend the event in Beijing. It should be of no surprise that, apart from the Prime Minister of Slovakia, Robert Fico, there are no Western leaders in attendance, largely due to the country's military dynamic. Such is not a new snub, for I remember way back in 2015, for the 70th anniversary, the situation was the same. Instead, those who are marking their attendance mostly consist of the countries that are the most devout in their political and military support to China as a whole.
As a result, this not surprisingly includes Russia's Vladimir Putin, but also North Korea's Kim Jong un (which is technically a surprise given he rarely travels) but also the leaders of Belarus, Cuba, Iran, Pakistan, Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Serbia, Zimbabwe, The Republic of the Congo, the Maldives, Nepal, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Azerbaijan, Serbia, and finally and most surprisingly, the acting President of the Myanmar Junta.
So let's unpack this list: First, you have the hardcore anti-Western bloc: Belarus, Cuba, Iran, Russia, North Korea, Myanmar, Pakistan, Zimbabwe, and to an extent, Serbia. These states are complete adversaries to the West and rely on strong diplomatic, political, economic, and military ties with China PR to effectively survive or resist, Pakistan being an outlier here as it is not nominally an "enemy" of the West, yet it is also China's largest supporter. As a result, their attendance at China's event constitutes a complete and unapologetic endorsement of Beijing's position and narrative. These countries are as close to "allies" as the word may allow, even if China's foreign policy is cautious and non-confrontational.
Russia needs China's ongoing support, North Korea is increasingly confident that it can exploit the geopolitical climate to strengthen ties, Iran has been increasingly outmatched in regional struggles by Israel, while Cuba needs support amidst the extremely hostile Trump administration and Marco Rubio's State Department. For Myanmar, this marks the first single major diplomatic moment they have had since their junta was systematically isolated amidst the coup and civil war. On Beijing's part, attendance is also calculated.
Next is the "Neighbourly relations category:" The states attending here are those that exist in China's geographic proximity and believe it is important, obligatory, or beneficial to attend this event to improve ties. While it sends a message to the West, we should not interpret their planned attendance as a total geopolitical endorsement; rather, these states will also continue to balance with the United States simultaneously. This is most obvious in the Southeast Asian countries that have lined up to attend: Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia. These states are not truly Anti-US, but pressures are driving them in China's direction, that includes the actions of Donald Trump in the trade war, which are known to have upset Vietnamese leaders, but also in the case of Malaysia and Indonesia, the factor of Islam and support for Palestine leading to wholesale Anti-US sentiment, making it politically easier to engage Beijing. If we count Cambodia and Laos, these are already the "China loyalists" of Southeast Asia. Finally, Nepal also fits into this category, which sits on China's border. A strong relationship with Beijing is essential for them to prevent total domination by India.
The next category of states is described as the "Geographic dependency" category. This category differs from the "neighbourly" category because, unlike South East Asian states, these countries are landlocked (and therefore without maritime access are isolated from American power projection), and thus subsequently depend on China entirely for economic growth and development through the furthering of transcontinental infrastructure via schemes such as the Belt and Road. This category defines Mongolia and every one of the "stans" in Central Asia, as well as Mongolia. In some cases, such as Mongolia, China is not even liked at all, but the realities of geography tie their hands. Geopolitics for them is a choice between China and Russia.
The last category is the "opportunist" states, countries that may see an opportunity for political, diplomatic, or economic gain through their attendance, but do not necessarily have any underlying loyalty or geographic dependency. This obviously includes Slovakia, a member of NATO and the European Union, Azerbaijan, a Turkey linked state that is also improving relations with the US and happy to do Erdogan's dirty work on underlying Russian influence in Armenia, the Maldives, who will continue to play off China and India, and of course The Republic of the Congo, who is obviously not "pro-west" being an African State, but will see economic gain from attending.
Thus, amongst the 26 attending China's commemoration of the war of resistance, we see a mixed variety of geopolitical motives: ranging from outright political support of Beijing, to improving neighbourly relations, to geographically forced necessity, and then diplomatic opportunism. Still, one can argue that the underlying formation of a "China-led bloc" is beginning to appear. There are, beyond this, many countries whose leaders will continue to visit China, but as it is diplomacy, timing and optics are huge considerations in the political symbolism that is manifest.
Thus, Australia's Anthony Albanese might have visited a couple of weeks ago, and India's Modi is in town soon, but neither of course for this specific event, and therein lies the game of geopolitics. Why might a leader want their country to be seen commemorating China's victory over Japan? For Russia and North Korea, the answer is obvious; for Vietnam and Indonesia, it might symbolise a warning to the West, whereas for a country like Slovakia, it is an act of defiance towards the European Union. The reasons are many, but the event remains what it is, and that's how it will be perceived.
The views do not necessarily reflect those of DotDotNews.
Read more articles by Tom Fowdy:
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