By Tom Fowdy
Within days of US President Donald Trump visiting China, he was followed in his footsteps by Vladimir Putin of Russia, who also met with Xi Jinping in Beijing. The two countries signed more than twenty new agreements, although only reached a "general understanding" regarding a new pipeline. Together, they immediately criticised aspects of America's conduct, including its war with Iran, the situation in the Strait of Hormuz, US support for Ukraine, violations of national sovereignty, as well as criticism of Japanese rearmament.
The Russia-China summit is a reality check in regard to geopolitics, as well as giving a clear view of China's broader goals and priorities and its relationship with respect to the United States. While the meeting with Trump last week brought lots of flowery words of goodwill, as I predicted, it did nothing to change the fundamental strategic status quo between the United States and China, which remains structurally irreversible, even if tentatively less hostile and calmer than in previous years. Beijing, by hosting Putin, continues to vest itself in the pursuit of a multipolar world order and hedge its bets accordingly, rejecting the unilateralist outlook of the American President. This is not so much a pursuit of an alliance with Moscow, but a great geopolitical game of "options."
It was only in 2022, on the sidelines of the Beijing Winter Olympics, that both Xi Jinping and Putin met to declare a "strategic partnership without limits." It was a somewhat ominous meeting, as just weeks later they invaded Ukraine, which was always how Putin planned it to be, for even as that war strained Beijing's relationship with Europe, the fundamentals of the Russia-China strategic partnership have remained intact, for they are underlined with the mutually reinforced interests of preserving strategic autonomy against American and Western hegemony. Both sides explicitly reject a world that is unilaterally dominated by the United States and concurrently believe that such an international system is a threat to their immediate national and domestic political interests.
While Donald Trump has sought to engage with both countries during his second term, and that has even involved breaking the taboo of shunning Russia amidst the war, it is very much clear that he has a limited ability to compromise in terms of American strategic objectives in his dealings with them, and everything here remains unchanged. For example, Trump might offer to end the war in Ukraine, but proposals for serious concessions to Moscow are thwarted, and thus aid to Kyiv has continued silently yet consistently. Similarly, the White House may play down support for Taiwan and object to independence, far more than Biden would, but the strategic status quo does not change, and the US continues to sell them arms.
Thus, Trump only makes deals on the premise of unilateral capitulation to American ties, and never on strategic compromise. Hence, even if he has been diplomatic towards Russia and China, the reality is he has been otherwise aggressive in his foreign policy, with regime change in Venezuela, an attempt to destroy the Iranian government, and a blockade of Cuba. While Trump's foreign policy pragmatically adapts to an emerging multipolar environment by emphasizing control over the western hemisphere, it nonetheless does not permit a multipolar world in practice and continues to press for a reasserted unipolar one, under the mantra of America First, by aggressively attempting to control critical strategic resources such as oil.
As a result, China, which has always rejected "American unilateralism," has embraced a diplomatic strategy of hedging against the United States by aiming to keep as many options open as possible, including with US allies themselves. Beijing's objective is to prevent the US from strategically isolating it and cornering it, especially on the economic front, whereas China has embraced free trade as the foundation of its export economy and is pitching itself as the positive resolution to America's trade wars, presenting itself as open and willing amidst Trump's global tariffs. For Russia, China has also become its primary backer against total isolation amidst the Ukraine war.
Thus, the visit of Putin to come right after Trump was not a coincidence. For China, this is a soft way of taking the initiative, to hedge itself against American criticism and strategic demands, and to show Trump that Beijing continues to have leverage by embracing another thorn in the West's side, Russia. Hence, while on one hand, China speaks of a positive and open relationship with the United States, it then continues to reject unilateralism and call for multipolarity on the other, which is a subtle rebuke of Trump's foreign policy and demands over issues such as Iran, thus preventing the US from dominating global issues. Likewise, Russia needs to show diplomatically that it does not stand alone, that Western pressure over Ukraine is not yielding results, and that it will continue to seek an outcome on its own terms.
Thus, in conclusion, this is a game of hedging. Russia and China are not allies, for they have broadly different areas of focus and disagreement. However, they nonetheless are fused into cooperation by a "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" logic, which formulates in a shared vision for a multipolar world, not to embrace each other, but so that each country's interests can be advanced without the perceived disruption of the larger power. To round that off, Xi will also be visiting North Korea next, which shows that the diplomatic dissonance of Trump's demands, and thus the embracing of China's wider strategic goals, continues unabated.
The views do not necessarily reflect those of DotDotNews.
Read more articles by Tom Fowdy:
Opinion | The strange fall of Keir Starmer
Opinion | What will Donald Trump's visit to China bring?
Opinion | The end of the 'Northern Red Wall' and the rise of a polarized Britain
Comment