Can you imagine a well-known company in China spends almost nothing on marketing?
In the first three quarters of 2025, its advertising expenses were only 22.57 million. Its humanoid robot shipments have already ranked first in the world, yet its R&D investment in the first three quarters of 2025 was less than 100 million.
On the surface, it's a manufacturing company, yet it has achieved a net profit margin of nearly 35%, almost catching up with the baijiu brand Wuliangye.
Put all of this together, and we can notice a very unusual combination: low marketing, low R&D, yet high growth and high profitability.
This also points to a more authentic side of Unitree: as one of the most closely watched tech companies in China, it is almost entirely composed of a series of "contradictions."
On one hand, you have cutting-edge technological narratives and relatively low R&D investment; on the other, you have the performance metrics of a high-end consumer goods company paired with a product stage that is far from mature.
At this stage, humanoid robots are still far from large-scale deployment. What truly sustains this business model is not the applications themselves, but the brand. And it is precisely this early-established brand momentum that allows it to achieve "counterintuitive" profitability in an industry that is not yet mature.
Unitree's revenue growth is almost exponential.
From 2022 to 2024, the company's revenue grew from 121 million (RMB) to 387 million. In 2025, it jumped directly to 1.708 billion, an increase of approximately 341% year-on-year.
Breaking down this growth provides a clearer picture.
First, the structure. Quadruped robots and humanoid robots are Unitree's two main revenue streams. As of the first three quarters of 2025, quadruped robot revenue was 488 million, accounting for 42.25%; humanoid robot revenue was 595 million, accounting for 51.53%. In other words, humanoid robots have become the largest source of revenue.
Still, the real change lies not in the proportion, but in the growth rate.
In 2023, humanoid robots were almost negligible, with full-year revenue of only 2.97 million. However, by the first three quarters of 2025, that figure had jumped to 595 million. Behind this is a growth path that is both typical and somewhat uncommon. For most high-growth hardware companies, revenue growth comes from two things: selling more and selling at higher prices.
However, Unitree took a different approach: using cost reduction to lower prices, and using lower prices to trigger a surge in scale.
Take humanoid robots as an example. In 2023, the average selling price was 593,400; by the first three quarters of 2025, it had dropped to 167,600, a decrease of about 71.7%.
The more critical factor was sales volume. In 2023, only five units were sold; in the first three quarters of 2025, 3,551 units were sold.
This means the core variable driving revenue growth shifted from "unit price" to "quantity."
Two factors drove this shift: One is the product. The H1, launched in 2023, was more of a "prototype" to validate product capability: high unit price, small batch. The real turning point was the launch of the G1 in 2024. As a medium-sized model, the G1 was lower in both cost and price than the H1. As its sales share increased, it naturally brought down the overall average price while pushing the product into a range where it could be sold at scale.
The other is strategy. In 2025, Unitree proactively reduced prices on some products. This reflects a very clear choice: Using price to gain market penetration. In the early stages of the industry, by offering more competitive pricing, a company can accelerate market education, scale up shipments, and simultaneously push down its cost curve, thereby securing market share ahead of time.
The same logic applies to quadruped robots.
From 2023 to the first three quarters of 2025, the average selling price of quadruped robots fell from 38,300 to 27,200, a drop of about 29%.
During the same period, sales volume grew from 3,121 units to 17,946 units, an increase of about 5.75 times.
As we can see, the two product lines essentially repeat the same story: Selling robots as consumer goods at scale.
Beyond products and strategy, there is another often overlooked but crucial variable in Unitree's revenue growth: perception. Before its appearance on the Spring Festival Gala in 2024, Unitree's overseas business was even stronger than its domestic business, with domestic revenue accounting for only 44.3%. However, by the first three quarters of 2025, that proportion had risen to 60.8%.
To some extent, the Spring Festival Gala 2026 helped Unitree achieve large-scale market education at a very low cost.
And it is precisely this unique brand advantage, born from that exposure, that became the key to Unitree's "counterintuitive" profitability.
What is most surprising in this prospectus is not Unitree's growth, but its profitability.
According to the prospectus, the company's recurring net profit in 2024 and 2025 was 77.5 million and 600 million, respectively.
Based on Unitree's 2025 revenue of 1.71 billion, its net profit margin is approximately 35%.
This figure itself is a real contradiction, not the profit margin of a "startup tech company," nor even that of a "manufacturing company."
This level is close to that of Wuliangye. In the first three quarters of 2025, Wuliangye's recurring net profit margin was 35.29%.
Even more remarkable, in 2024 and the first three quarters of 2025, the company's net operating cash flow was 190 million and 428 million, respectively. This means it is not only highly profitable but also generates "real cash."
A robotics industry yet to achieve true large-scale deployment has already demonstrated the profitability of a consumer goods company. What's even more counterintuitive is that this profit was not achieved through "price increases."
On the contrary, it was realized during a period of continuous price reductions.
From 2024 to the first three quarters of 2025, the company's gross profit margin increased from 56.41% to 59.45%.
Looking back, Unitree has taken a very "heavy" path: full-stack in-house development of both complete units and core components. From motor drives to mechanical structures to whole-body control systems, it controls most of the core links internally.
This leads to two direct outcomes: controllable performance and controllable costs.
Furthermore, by developing and manufacturing core components in-house, the company has also integrated its supply chain, forming vertical integration. As shipment volumes expand, its bargaining power with upstream suppliers strengthens, continuously driving down the cost curve.
Of course, Unitree's strong profitability also benefits from its extremely low expense ratios. This precisely highlights the second contradiction within Unitree.
As a brand that is practically a household name, Unitree spends almost nothing on marketing. In the first three quarters of 2025, its selling expenses were only 76 million, accounting for 6.51% of revenue; advertising expenses within that were only 22.57 million.
R&D expenses are similarly restrained. In the first three quarters of 2025, R&D investment was 90.2 million, less than 100 million. In comparison, Dobot's 2024 revenue was 374 million, yet its administrative expenses were as high as 161 million.
On one side, a cutting-edge industry requiring high investment, long cycles, and far from full maturity; on the other side, a financial structure characterized by high gross margins, low expenses, and strong cash flow.
These two elements should not coexist, but Unitree has managed to combine them.
Regarding this, what might be more worth considering is not the outcome itself, but the reasons behind it: Why has such a business structure emerged first in an industry that is not yet mature? Is this a temporary anomaly or the beginning of a new normal for future industries?
(Source: Guijijun, WeChat Public Platform)
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