By Angelo Giuliano
A landscape of persistent pressure
Covering this region, the strategic reality on the ground is clear: the dominant concern within defense and political circles is not a full-scale ground invasion, an endeavor widely viewed as logistically improbable and politically untenable. Instead, the operational and psychological focus is on countering the sustained, multidimensional pressure of sanctions and the ever-present threat of targeted stand-off strikes. Based on regular briefings, observable military-civilian exercises, and the tangible economic strain, Venezuela's national defense doctrine has evolved into a direct, pragmatic response to these credible forms of coercion. It is a strategy built not on matching force with force, but on leveraging the nation's most abundant resource—its population and difficult terrain—to create a deterrent of last resort.
This understanding is not merely academic; it is reflected in daily life and official rhetoric. Military parades feature not just tanks and missiles, but columns of militiamen in distinctive uniforms. Public messaging consistently ties national sovereignty to the concept of popular defense. The threat scenario, therefore, has been meticulously shaped: the primary effort is to make the nation indigestible, transforming it from a target into a strategic quagmire.
Observable mobilization: The "Nation in Arms" in practice
From field observations across several states, from the capital to rural zones, the "Nation in Arms" policy is a tangible, actively implemented framework far beyond propaganda. The state-sponsored National Militia, reportedly numbering in the millions, systematically incorporates citizens into a formal auxiliary defense structure. In practical terms, this translates to weekend training musters in public plazas, civilian instruction in basic weapon handling and irregular tactics, and the establishment of local command cells integrated into the military's territorial defense plan.
This mobilization fundamentally alters the potential battlefield calculus for any external actor. A conventional military intervention would not only have to engage and defeat the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB) but would also immediately activate a vast, decentralized territorial defense network. This network is designed to operate without central command, leveraging local knowledge to conduct harassment, sabotage, and intelligence operations. It is augmented by more specialized, localized structures often referred to as colectivos or community defense units, particularly visible in urban and peri-urban zones. Their stated mission, as explained in unofficial conversations, is to complicate and destabilize any potential occupation through persistent local resistance, making the establishment of secure administrative control a near impossibility.
The logic of deterrence: A calculated strategic message
Interviews with security analysts in Caracas consistently underscore a strategic logic of deterrence by denial and cost imposition. The doctrine does not claim the capability to win a conventional, force-on-force war; such a notion is openly dismissed as fantasy against a superpower. Instead, the aim is to render the very decision to invade strategically irrational from the outset.
By publicly and visibly demonstrating this depth of societal and territorial mobilization, the state communicates a clear, calculated message to any potential aggressor: you may achieve a temporary tactical victory by seizing airfields and government buildings, but you will inevitably inherit a protracted, resource-draining, and politically toxic insurgency. The objective is to safeguard sovereignty by raising the projected cost of its violation to a level that is operationally, financially, and politically prohibitive. It is a strategy that seeks to win not on the battlefield, but in the war-gaming scenarios and cost-benefit analyses of its adversaries.
The critical vulnerability: A fundamental mismatch of threats
However, extensive field analysis reveals a core and potentially fatal vulnerability in this defensive architecture. The entire system is optimized for a specific, low-probability contingency—a large-scale ground occupation reminiscent of past conflicts. Yet, the state remains acutely exposed to the more likely and debilitating forms of coercion that define 21st-century power projection.
The most immediate and damaging pressure is unequivocally economic. The sophisticated sanctions regime targeting the state oil company PDVSA and the international financial system acts as a persistent, slow-motion siege, eroding the very capacity to maintain the militia structures and public loyalty upon which the deterrent relies. The more plausible military threat, based on a clear-eyed assessment of adversary capabilities, is not an invasion force but a stand-off campaign of precision strikes. Such a campaign would aim to decapitate military command and control, degrade integrated air defense networks, and cripple critical national infrastructure—such as the already fragile refineries, electrical grids, and ports—from a distance, with minimal risk.
The strategic disconnect: Territorial depth versus stand-off power
This exposure creates a fundamental strategic disconnect. The carefully prepared militia forces, while posing a potent long-term insurgent threat in a hypothetical occupation scenario, offer no direct counter to long-range precision munitions, cyber attacks, or financial isolation. A modern stand-off campaign seeks to collapse the state's functional capacity and political cohesion from a distance, effectively bypassing and negating the very "nation in arms" response it is designed to trigger. The primary deterrent, for all its domestic symbolism and depth, is strategically neutralized by a form of conflict it is not organized, equipped, or conceptually structured to engage.
Conclusion: The paradox of asymmetric resilience
In summary, Venezuela has constructed a formidable and psychologically potent deterrent against an improbable full-scale invasion by leveraging its human and geographic depth to promise an unwinnable aftermath. This represents a significant investment in national resilience and a powerful statement of sovereign defiance. Yet, this very focus exposes a profound paradox: the nation is arguably over-prepared for one existential threat while remaining critically under-prepared for another.
The ultimate restraint on large-scale military aggression may therefore depend less on the direct threat of guerrilla warfare and more on the anticipated catastrophic regional and humanitarian consequences of state collapse—consequences that would inevitably follow either a successful stand-off campaign or the internal unraveling fueled by economic warfare. Venezuela's defense posture is a definitive and complex statement of resistance, but one that starkly underscores the challenging, often tragic, asymmetry between national resilience and the evolving tools of external coercive power. The shield is designed for the sword of the last century, while the threat is increasingly one of targeted strangulation from afar.
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Read more articles by Angelo Giuliano:
Opinion | The looming threat: False flags and the pretext for war in Venezuela
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