By Tom Fowdy
According to a report by the South China Morning Post (SCMP), China's foreign Minister Wang Yi reportedly, without quotation, told the European Union's Representative for Foreign Affairs, Kaja Kallas (An Estonian ultra-hawk), "that Beijing does not want to see a Russian loss in Ukraine because it fears the United States would then shift its whole focus to Beijing, according to several people familiar with the exchange."
The report was filtered through Finbar Bermingham, a journalist for the SCMP who, despite its China roots, is part of an EU politics-focused anti-China foreign policy ecosystem comprised of numerous American-sponsored think-tanks and representatives. Their primary goal is to promote Atlanticist narratives and undermine engagement between Brussels and Beijing wherever possible. Thus, it is natural on such a basis, and not considering Kalla's vocal stances on these issues, that such a report would emerge.
However, from an international relations perspective, that does not mean what was said was in fact untrue, although I would argue perhaps it was said "in so many words" than how it is depicted in print. The thesis is quite simple: That China sees the war in Ukraine as a strategic conundrum; if Russia loses in Ukraine, it affirms NATO and US military supremacy in Europe, therefore, the United States will not see Moscow as a strategic threat and subsequently reorient its entire foreign policy focus towards containing China, and thus militarising the pacific.
I actually agree with this thesis, and to some extent, even though the war is continuing, it is obviously the strategic intention of the Trump administration, albeit with caveats. The White House wants to downsize and end the conflict in Ukraine so it can divert its priorities towards Beijing. However, rather than aiming to inflict total defeat on Moscow, a clear policy of the Biden era, the Trump administration clearly intends to utilise a strategic recalibration by normalising ties with Moscow, so it is not dependent upon China. Thus, their logic is that by giving Russia some kind of political space, and ending the war in Ukraine with somewhat more compromise, tensions in Europe can be nullified and China can be isolated in Asia.
In other words, US re-engagement with Moscow intends to be a "reverse Kissinger" and thus drive a wedge into the "no limits" strategic partnership between Russia and China. However, none of this is as simple or as straightforward as it looks. First of all, Trump's attempts to end the conflict have fallen flat and in recent months, especially since his trade war escalation, none of it really looks too serious. I theorised that Trump would in fact weaponise aid and escalation to drive Moscow to the table in a classic Trumpian theatrical way, as of yet he has not done this and even announced a freeze on certain types of aid to Ukraine the other day.
Second, it seems increasingly obvious that Putin will not end the war until he is satisfied he can do so on his own terms, unless, of course, he is existentially forced to do so. The Kremlin, for the time being, appears to be rejecting a "messy compromise" of a frozen conflict whereby Russia takes most of the four regions it annexes, but of course, due to European diplomacy, Kyiv remains independent and continues a pro-Atlantic, pro-Europe alignment anyway. This is juxtaposed by the reality that the leadership in Ukraine sees it as political suicide to compromise with Moscow, thus, the war continues.
Given this context, why would China force Moscow towards peace now? From a realist point of view, Beijing has a vested interest in ensuring that Russia does not experience strategic failure and thus prolonging this limbo. If the war ends, we know from experience that the Trump administration will "declare victory", even if it is botched (he did this with North Korea in 2018), and will move on.
However, if Russia continues to press and eventually things go sour for Kyiv (the war is now entering Dnipro oblast), this will induce an existential security crisis within Europe with Russia emerging strategically emboldened and thus quashing the objective the Biden administration set, which sought to strangle Moscow. This, of course, blocks Trump's proposals for a strategic equilibrium precisely because it is (as it was already) implausible that America sought to choose between Europe and Russia, and therefore, the idea of pacifying Moscow to turn all guns on Beijing is a fantasy.
Thus, is it unrealistic that Wang Yi told European officials such a thing, even if not as overtly? Of course not. Russia's loss is China's loss, precisely because the strategic and ideological ramifications of Russian defeat strike at the heart of the "multipolar" vision Beijing has subscribed too. Hence, even though China has called for "peace" since the conflict began, it is a compromise peace that ultimately rejects the expansion of NATO and considers Russia's security concerns. In this case, we should remind ourselves it's always been obvious that Beijing is never going to squeeze Moscow to end it, so really, do we learn anything new from this story? Of course not.
The views do not necessarily reflect those of DotDotNews.
Read more articles by Tom Fowdy:
Opinion | Trump's new 'trade deal' with Vietnam is little more than one-sided subjugation
Opinion | Another Trump Drama Cycle comes to an end with dramatic effect
Opinion | Understanding China's Approach to the Middle East, and contrasting it with the US
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