Opinion | HK no longer seen as China's Achilles heel after national security legislation

By Grenville Cross

The event that sticks most in my mind from 2003 when I served as the Director of Public Prosecutions was the failed attempt by CH Tung's government to enact the BL Art.23 national security proposals.

Although HK was constitutionally obligated to enact laws to protect itself and the country, anti-China forces did all they could to mobilize opposition. Because Macao was less important to them, they did not organize the same levels of opposition there, and Macao was able to enact its national security law (based on Art.23 of the Macao Basic Law), in 2009, ten years after its reunification. Foreign politicians, including the ex-governor, Chris Patten, sought to whip up concerns among local people over Tung's proposals, which they claimed were unnecessary as well as harmful to HK's way of life, and many ordinary people were misled by them.

In fact, Tung's proposals were very mild, and his government bent over backwards to allay people's concerns. Indeed, responding to people's views, his government made three revisions of its draft legislation, and made 51 amendments, but the anti-China forces refused to be appeased, as they were bent on confrontation. The unpatriotic political forces, including the "Article 23 Concern Group," which morphed in 2006 into the notorious Civic Party, realized that their ability to use HK as a base for undermining China and furthering the interests of its geopolitical rivals would be curbed once BL Art.23 was enacted, and they blindly opposed the proposals. They made common cause with the US and its allies, who were afraid that the proposals would make it very difficult for them to interfere in local politics, and whose intelligence agencies would find it more difficult to operate in Hong Kong.

What united the local and foreign opponents of Tung's proposals was a shared belief that HK's "one country, two systems" (OCTS) governing policy could be used by them as a means of undermining China. Although this was not apparent to everyone in 2003, it became blindingly obvious as years went by, culminating in the insurrection they launched in 2019. It was a huge pity that, after hostile forces organized street demonstrations to protest against Tung's proposals, there was a failure of will inside the government, and the proposals were abandoned.

This left me very saddened, and also worried. Saddened, because it showed that HK was unable to discharge the important responsibility it had been entrusted with by the Central Authorities to enact national security legislation "on its own" (Art.23). It worried, because it showed weakness, and this could be exploited by China's enemies, which was exactly what happened, first in 2014, and then, most notably, in 2019.

Although things were quiet for a while, it was only the calm before the storm. The hostile forces were only biding their time, building themselves up, forming closer ties with anti-China elements abroad, and readying themselves for far worse. As the withdrawal of Tung's proposals meant there was a legal vacuum where the national security laws were supposed to be, the authorities were ill-equipped to confront the challenges that were developing, including from those who wanted to separate HK from its motherland, and to use HK to directly confront China.

The first big challenge came when the streets of Central and parts of Kowloon were occupied by hostile elements for 79 days in 2014 (to the delight of their foreign backers, who egged them on). Although the chaos was ultimately contained, this was only after the city, its businesses and its people had suffered greatly. Emboldened by this episode, and with overseas encouragement, China's antagonists launched their insurrection in 2019, and the authorities were ill-prepared. Because of the withdrawal of the BL Art.23 proposals in 2003, the police lacked the tools they needed to combat the violence of the secessionists and those who wanted to wreck HK as a means of undermining China.

With the enactment of the NSL in 2020 and the SNSO in 2024, HK is now secure, the anti-China forces have been contained, and it is far more difficult for foreign powers to take advantage of HK's unique position in order to strike at China. HK, therefore, is, once again, a safe place to do business, a nice place in which to live, and a useful place for those who want to deal with the Chinese mainland. The era of chaos is well and truly over, and HK can now look forward to a bright future. This does not mean that China's geopolitical rivals will not continue with their mischief-making or will stop trying to harm HK, but what it does mean is that HK is now far better equipped to defend itself, and will never again fall prey to the machinations of those who wish to destroy its capitalist system and way of life.

As President Xi Jinping made clear when he visited HK in 2022, the OCTS policy is working well, and there is no reason why it should not endure indefinitely. This has put everybody's minds to rest over what the future will hold for HK after the BL's "50 years unchanged" (Art.5) provision is reached in 2047. It will be "business and usual," and HK can look forward to a bright, safe and prosperous future, fully supported by its motherland, and this is because its national security defenses are now secure.

In 2014, when President Xi Jinping addressed the National Security Commission of the Chinese Communist Party, he described his idea of "big security." He said that China "should take an overall approach to national security, strengthen the confidence of the Chinese people in the path, theories and system of socialism with distinctive Chinese features, and ensure China's durable peace and stability." This applies to Hong Kong and Macao, just as it does to the Chinese mainland.

Although XI is a great supporter of OCTS, nobody suggests that this comes at the expense of national security. Over the past four years, HK has made huge progress towards ensuring its own security and that of the country, first with the enactment of the NSL in 2020 and then with the introduction of the SNSO in 2024. It has more than made up for the inaction of the 23 years from 1997 to 2020, which resulted in dangers emerging to the whole of China. Taken together, these two laws are comprehensive, and they cover all bases. It appears to me that these developments satisfy Xi's target of "big security," and that HK has done all that could reasonably be expected of it. No longer can it be seen as China's Achilles heel, and it can now play its full part in protecting the country from domestic and foreign threats. Of course, it cannot be complacent, and unforeseen dangers may arise, which is why the SNSO has given the HKSAR Chief Executive the power to issue subsidiary legislation.

However, after the traumatic years of 2019-24, which involved a great preoccupation with national security, HK's protections are now in place. This is buttressed by patriotic education within its educational institutions, so that young people understand what it means to be Chinese, appreciate national imperatives, and acquire positive values. It is, therefore, now time to move on, and to focus on other things. This means concentrating upon ensuring HK's commercial, financial and social successes, and promoting people's livelihoods. A happy, safe and prosperous HK is what its people want, and it is now up to its government to ensure this is what they get.

The author is a senior counsel and law professor, and was previously the director of public prosecutions of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

The views do not necessarily reflect those of DotDotNews.