Opinion | How 'glide bombs' present a new dilemma for Ukraine

By Tom Fowdy

The Ukraine war has undoubtedly represented a harsh learning curve for Russia. After initially believing they could topple Kyiv's government in a pre-emptive blitzkrieg with a thin conventional force, Moscow found itself locked into a full-blown, protracted conflict that it was not initially prepared for, and is now in its 3rdyear. It is undeniable within that period that Ukraine, backed with western arms and intelligence, proved to be a more formidable opponent than Putin had initially gambled, and although western propaganda relentlessly, if not absurdly, exaggerated Kyiv's battlefield successes, Russia nonetheless experienced significant setbacks in the year of 2022.

Yet since that time, what has gone wrong for Russia? Although Ukraine supporters will inevitably point to the usual talking points such as "loss of black sea ships," as well as Kyiv's ludicrously exaggerated numbers of Russian casualties, it remains true that Ukraine has not actually had asinglesuccess on the battlefield since it retook Kherson in 2022. Its 2023 counteroffensive, which was hyped astronomically by the mainstream media as its gambit that would isolate cut and off Crimea, failed completely. Why? Because as much as Russia made many mistakes in the early stages, it ultimately adapted and learned these hard lessons, and Ukraine has been on the backfoot ever since.

First, Russia prepared itself for future Ukraine counteroffensives by organising defence in-depth. Ukraine's strategy to try and drive Russia out of the country focused on pressing multiple pressure points simultaneously across a broad front and catching Moscow by surprise. This is what led to the successful Kharkiv and Kherson counteroffensives in 2022. However, this was only possible while Russia's lines were spread thin and were outnumbered by Ukraine. Successive waves of mobilisation have rendered this strategy obsolete, but moreover Russia also prepared for such attacks by creating multiple lines of defence lined with barriers and minefields based on an old Soviet doctrine. This blunted Ukraine's southern offensive effortlessly.

Then, secondly, at the turn of 2024 Russia has initiated a new mode of offensive strategy which is brutal, cheap, and efficient, that is to simply drop gigantic aerial glided FAB bombs onto Ukraine positions. These Soviet era bombs, created in the 1950s, are simple yet extremely explosive devices which have a large radius and are amongst the most powerful non-nuclear weapons. Russia has also fitted them with simple navigation systems. Bombers drop them while staying away from the frontlines and air-defences, where they then glide onto the target. This is allowing Russia to destroy Ukraine defences and fortifications easily, which is what allowed them to seize Avdiivka in what was their largest victory since 2022. It is reported they dropped around 40-60 of these bombs on the town today, reducing it to rubble and of course making it untenable for the defenders.

Ukraine do not have much of an answer to the "glide bomb" strategy as their air defence systems are running low on supply, and US aid to Ukraine has effectively been blocked in congress for months. Moreover, Russia is now also starting to mass produce Glide bombs, including even the largest FAB-9000 category which has a blast radius of 1km. This is taking its toll on Ukraine's forces. However, one should be conservative in describing it at this stage as a "decisive breakthrough" for Russia, who is advancing in the east of the country now because of it, but only at an incremental pace. If there is one thing clear from it though, is that this long-pressed mythology of Ukraine inevitably "winning" the war against Russia, is very much dead.

I had after all, said a year ago at the beginning of 2023 that that particular year would be the "defining" year of the war in Ukraine, and I noted at the time that Ukraine's upcoming southern counteroffensive was the only opportunity they had left to end it on their terms. That window is closed, and even if the peak of western support at that particular time could not allow them to push forwards, one might askeven ifthe US aid which is held up in congress was given now, what difference could it plausibly make bar perhaps ensuring a stalemate? The US originally aimed to utilise the Ukraine war to impose a strategic defeat on Russia and militarily cripple it, that hasn't happened. Therefore, what is their end game? It is little surprise as to why some European politicians have gone as far to toy with the idea of deploying troops now.

Thus, as Russia slowly glide bombs its way west, it seems inevitable on any outcome that the longer the war drags on, the more of an excruciating cost Ukraine will pay. It's not a question of "Will Ukraine regain Crimea?" as some people delusionally claimed for two years, it's a question of how much they will ultimately lose in the end and how far Moscow will go and drag it out until it ultimately sees fit to give up.

The author is a well-seasoned writer and analyst with a large portfolio related to China topics, especially in the field of politics, international relations and more. He graduated with an Msc. in Chinese Studies from Oxford University in 2018.

The views do not necessarily reflect those of DotDotNews.

Read more articles by Tom Fowdy:

Opinion | The push to revive tourism in HK

Opinion | Israel's war of impunity

Opinion | China's economy is picking up, the media said it was finished

Opinion | How the British government plays 'the China card' tactically