Opinion | How North Korea's era of alienation came to an end
By Tom Fowdy
At beginning of this week, North Korea's KCNA reported that leader Kim Jong un and Vladimir Putin had exchanged letters, vowing to "expand the comprehensive and constructive bilateral relations with common efforts". The warm letters came amidst the annual celebration of Korean independence from Japan on August 15th, and as Russia continues its conflict against a Ukraine backed with a coalition of western countries. In facing disapproval from the west, Putin has clearly turned his focus towards Pyongyang, with continual reports that North Korean labourers will be tasked to rebuild occupied territories in the east of the country.
In more than a few ways, the growing reproachment of Moscow and Pyongyang represents a full circle of history. The DPRK after all was created with the influence of the Soviet Union. Following the surrender of Imperial Japan, Soviet forces moved into the Korean peninsula and divided it with the United States along the 38th parallel, later installing in power former army Captain Kim Il Sung and setting in motion a cold war divide which has not only outlived the original Cold War (1945-1991) but also entered into the new one emerging. North Korea's creation was a direct product of geopolitical struggle, yet having since faced alienation in the era of US unipolarity, discovers renewed purpose and interest in itself.
North Korea's geopolitical importance to both Russia and China, both past and present, revolves around it existing as a strategic counterweight towards the United States and its allies in South Korea and Japan. It was in this environment that the DPRK thrived in the 1960s as it exploited the Sino-Soviet split to procure aid from both Moscow and Beijing, giving it a temporary economic advantage over the south. However, it would be following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and Deng Xiaoping's policies in favor of building relations with the west, that the hardest times fell on the country as it faced international isolation and a collapse of its economy, with Boris Yeltsin cutting off all trade with it in the bid to charm the United States.
It was during this period, stretching from 1991 to the 2010s, that few believed the DPRK had a future at all. Impoverished and seemingly a "relic" of history, western discourse repeatedly framed North Korea as a leftover of the Cold War which faced inevitable and imminent collapse. These broader assumptions came as part of the "End of History" thesis, which argued western liberalism had established itself as the ultimate and final stage of human progress, and that Communist and authoritarian regimes would be a thing of the past. Indeed, even beyond North Korea itself, it was broadly assumed that China was on an inevitable path to liberalization and opening up. It was unthinkable less than even a decade ago, that both states could survive in their current form.
Yet the world has changed so rapidly, and so quickly, that Fukuyama's theory has aged tremendously poorly to the point it has been panned. On realizing that their ideological domination of the world was no longer inevitable, the world has entered in a new age of geopolitical struggle as the west seeks to preserve its hegemony against Russia and China, creating new flashpoints in Ukraine, the South China Sea and Taiwan. In doing so, on the Korean Peninsula the DPRK has lived to see yet another day and find itself as a critical fulcrum in this emerging environment, allowing it to receive a scale of diplomatic support it has not seen in decades.
Indeed, China and Russia swiftly vetoed a new American UN sanctions resolution against North Korea earlier this year, showing that the age of both powers cooperating with America's to curb Pyongyang's nuclear weapons with sanctions has firmly come to an end. Once again, North Korea is protected by bigger powers, which will give it a window to escaping the economic troubles that both sanctions and isolation have beset it over the past 30 years. This also means Kim Jong un will also be able to complete his nuclear weapons ambitions with relative impunity, rendering America's long-term ambition to pursue the "complete denuclearization" of the country an obvious failure, further undermining America's bid to sustain absolute military hegemony over Asia.
In conclusion, the strange turn in North Korea's fortunes is demonstrative as to how history does not always go in straight lines, or towards ideological inevitabilities as many in the west naively assumed. Both China and Russia now have more incentives than at any point since 1991 to ensure the DPRK state does not meet its demise at the hands of the United States, who was allowed to hold its population under the jackboot of crippling sanctions. After effectively shelving it for 30 years, the old and historical partnership with Pyongyang is now being dusted down, and few can seriously predict this time how the story is going to end.
The author is a well-seasoned writer and analyst with a large portfolio related to China topics, especially in the field of politics, international relations and more. He graduated with an Msc. in Chinese Studies from Oxford University in 2018.
The views do not necessarily reflect those of DotDotNews.
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